





Rahmatian, A.  (2016) European copyright inside or outside the European 
Union: pluralism of copyright laws and the ‘‘Herderian 
paradox’’.International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, 47(8), pp. 912-940. (doi:10.1007/s40319-016-0531-4) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 

























European Copyright Inside or Outside the European 
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‘Herderian Paradox’ 
 




It is part of the agenda of the EU to harmonise and unify laws of its Member States to 
further the cause of greater integration, especially a common market, free movement 
of goods, free movement of capital, free movement of services, and, in reality to a 
lesser extent, free movement of people.1 Differences of national laws and regulations 
which could hinder this free movement or discourage investors from other Member 
States should therefore be ironed out.2 Copyright is but one example of that general 
principle.3 This agenda has led to research by intellectual property scholars into the 
possibility of a harmonised European copyright law,4 also in view of already existing 
harmonisations and even unifications of trade mark and patent law. There are several 
reservations to an unrestrained harmonisation or even unification of private or 
commercial law,5 and although this is a topic of general comparative law, copyright is 
a good example for demonstrating the problems. Harmonisation or unification of laws 
does not necessarily further European integration. In the light of recent political and 
                                                 
1 See e.g. the website of the EU Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/index_en.htm 
(visited 8 April 2016). 
2 See, e.g. the recent Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
etc., Upgrading The Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business, COM(2015) 550 
final, 28 Oct. 2015; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market, 2016/0280 (COD), Recitals (1) and (3). 
3 See e.g. Recitals (6) and (7) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC. 
4 E.g. The Wittem Group, ‘European Copyright Code’, (2011) 33(2) EIPR, 76-82; S. Fitzpatrick, 
‘Prospects of further copyright harmonisation?’, (2003) 25(5) EIPR, 215-223, at 222-223; T. Cook and 
E. Derclaye, ‘An EU Copyright Code; what and how, if ever?’, (2011), IPQ 3, 259-269; E. Rosati, 
“The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code’, (2010) 5(12) JIPLP, 862-868; J. A. L. 
Sterling, ‘International codification of copyright law: possibilities and imperatives’, (2002) 33(3) IIC, 
270-293, at 285-290. Critical: H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘European copyright law- ever more horizontal’, 
(2001) 32(5) IIC 532-545; R. Taylor, ‘Against an integrated intellectual property code: a response to 
“Reforming intellectual property law: an obvious and not-so-obvious agenda”’, (2009), IPQ 3, 281-
287.  
5 See the well-known vociferous criticism by P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’, 60 Modern 
Law Review (1997) 44-62; A newer and more topical discussion by M. Hesselink, ‘The case for a 
common European sales law in an age of rising nationalism’, (2012) 8(3) European Review of Contract 
Law, 342-366. These authors discuss European private (contract) law, but similar problems appear in 
relation to European intellectual property law. 
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social events, a movement towards further harmonisation (also in copyright law) 
could even be detrimental to the European cause.  
The European Union is currently in a profound crisis. The weakening of the 
European idea and its values started especially with the rescuing of the banks in the 
financial crisis of 2009-10 which was mostly implemented through the states taking 
on large public debts funded by taxpayer’s money, and this created sovereign debt 
was then collectivised in the ESFS and ESM devices.6 That situation was used to 
justify economic austerity measures, and Greece in particular was forced to agree to 
an extended policy of austerity7 in long bail-out negotiations with EU representatives 
on 13 July 2015,8 a course of action which was widely seen as undemocratic and 
potentially humiliating to a Member State of the EU.9 Since Germany had a leading 
role in these negotiations and the method of conduct, perhaps to divert from its then 
negative image10 in summer 2015, it invited, initially unrestrictedly, a large number of 
refugees from the war-torn Middle East.11 Now Germany and the EU send refugees 
and migrants back, assisted by an agreement with Turkey. 12  German and EU 
representatives complain about the lack of solidarity among Member States in the 
refugee crisis.13 But the lack of solidarity among Member States cannot come as a 
surprise with a supranational entity that is completely and almost exclusively 
grounded on free market competition, 14  the exact opposite of solidarity. The 
competition in relation to ever lower corporation tax rates and advantageous tax deals 
                                                 
6 See e.g. in more detail as to the technicalities, Ch. Hofmann, ‘Stabilizing the financial sector: EU 
financial services 2010-2012’, (2012) 8(4) European Review of Contract Law, 426-455, at 426-430; K. 
A. Armstrong, ‘The new governance of EU fiscal discipline’ (2013) 38(5) European Law Review, 601-
617, at 605-606. 
7 Well-known economists across the political spectrum always pointed out that austerity measures 
made it impossible that the Greek economy could recover, though with different arguments and 
consequences, see e.g. P. Krugman, ‘Austerity and the Greek Depression’, New York Times, 10 July 
2015; H. W. Sinn, ‘Greek tragedy’, 26 July 2011, http://www.cesifo-group.de/ (visited 8 April 2016). 
8 E.g. I. Traynor, ‘Greece crisis talks: the July weekend that saved the euro but broke the EU?’, I. 
Traynor, J. Rankin, ‘Greek Debt Crisis: Tsipras resists key bailout measures after 15 hours of talks’, 
both in The Guardian, 13 July 2015; M. Uken, ‘Alles für den Euro’, Die Zeit (online), 13 July 2015. 
9 E.g. P. Krugman, ‘Killing the European Project’, New York Times, Opinion Pages, 12 July 2015; A. 
Evans-Pritchard, ‘Greece is being treated like a hostile occupied state’, The Telegraph, 13 July 2015.  
10 The treatment of Greece was highly controversial in Germany itself, even among politicians, e.g. J. 
Fischer, former German minster of foreign affairs, ‘Fatale Entscheidung für ein deutsches Europa’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2015. 
11 The ulterior motive for this seemingly generous invitation to Germany was mostly to obtain the 
cheap labour force of educated young people – what Germany needs because of its demographic 
situation. 
12 The Council of Europe has voiced serious human rights concerns in relation to this ‘refugee deal’, 
see J. Rankin, ‘Council of Europe condemns EU’s refugee deal with Turkey’, The Guardian, 20 April 
2016. 
13 E.g. J.-C. Juncker, ‘European Solidarity in a World of Crises’, Project Syndicate, 8 Jan 2016: 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/ (visited 8 April 2016). 
14 For intellectual property, see e.g. the statement in Recital (8) of the IP Enforcement Directive 
2004/48/EC: ‘The disparities between the [enforcement] systems of the Member States […] [do] not 
promote free movement within the Internal Market or create an environment conducive to healthy 
competition.’ 
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among Member States to the detriment of their national economics illustrates that 
problem nicely.15 The referendum on 23 June in the UK which decided in favour of 
Britain leaving the EU could also be seen a symptom of this crisis, but it was not 
really. The referendum campaign was largely devoid of intellectual argument and 
mainly devoted to xenophobia 16  and political infighting within the governing 
Conservative Party, 17  or to abusive personalised quibbling instead of judicious 
critique. 18  The existent problems with the EU had hardly ever been discussed 
genuinely and intelligently, and featured far less in the minds of the voting public than 
some commentators may now claim when rationalising the result. The decision of the 
referendum was very unfortunate und unwise. It was, however, foreseeable because of 
its xenophobe rhetoric, not because of any trenchant criticism of the EU institutions. 
It has nevertheless become more difficult to make a convincing argument in 
favour of the EU at present, and its program of incessant and ever-increasing legal 
harmonisation plays an important part in that. More harmonisation could be 
prejudicial to the European idea. This perhaps unexpected argument is what I will call 
in the following the ‘Herderian paradox’, after the German philosopher and man of 
letters Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) who became influential (and 
misunderstood) particularly in his native Germany. 
 
 
The ‘Herderian paradox’ as an explanation for potential damage to the 
‘European idea’ by further harmonisation in the present political situation  
 
For an understanding of the possible damage which the centrifugal forces of EU 
copyright unification can cause one must appreciate certain intellectual movements in 
history, and here one can draw inspiration from Herder. Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
                                                 
15 Luxembourg has become notorious for that, see e.g. ‘LuxLeaks: Jean-Claude Juncker se défend 
d’être “l’ami du grand capital”’, Le Monde (online), 12 Nov. 2014, S. Bower, N. Watt, ‘Luxembourg 
tax files: Juncker ‘solved problem’ for Amazon move, The Guardian, 10 Dec. 2014. But other EU 
States, such as Ireland, Britain, or the Netherlands are similar examples. 
16 Notably the only ones in Europe who welcomed the British EU referendum result were far right-
wing political parties. 
17 It has been amusing to witness that the principal and popular – and populist – campaigner for 
‘Brexit’ and winner of the referendum who used the question of EU membership only for trying to 
propel himself to the office of prime minister has been brutally eliminated in the last minute by this 
closest political allies. He used the people for his career but forgot that others would use his for theirs. 
See e.g. Gordon Rayner, ‘How Boris Johnson was brought to his knees by the “cuckoo nest plot”’, The 
Telegraph, 1 July 2016. 
18 A good illustration was the warning in a publication of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) of 25 
May 2016 (http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8296) (visited 25 May 2016) that the effect of leaving 
the EU on public finances would require at least an additional one or two years of austerity, which 
prompted the reaction by the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign that the IFS is a ‘paid-up propaganda arm of the 
European Commission,’ see e.g. M. Weaver and A. Asthana, ‘Vote Leave attacks IFS thinktank over 
Brexit austerity prediction’, The Guardian, 25 May 2016. 
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magnum opus was the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas 
on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind) (1784-1791), a voluminous work in 
which he developed his philosophy of history. It is not possible and not necessary for 
present purposes to explain the overarching concept and thesis of this idiosyncratic 
work of over 900 pages. The relevant point in Herder’s theory here is that he 
emphasises a principally irreducible innate cultural difference in peoples while all 
human beings are, at the same time, ultimately the same.19 There is a distinctive 
‘national character’ (Nationalcharakter) of peoples,20 an idea which could already be 
found with Montesquieu21 and in the Scottish Enlightenment especially with Lord 
Kames,22 David Hume23 and Adam Ferguson, all of whom exercised some influence 
on Herder. Herder’s ‘national character’ results from a somewhat mystical 
combination of history and tradition, and education and civilisation, but also from 
nature and climate.24 The kind and extent of nation states is shaped by that national 
character:25  
 
Nature raises families; the natural State is also one people, with one national character. For 
millennia this character is retained in it and can be developed most naturally if its prince, born 
with its people, wishes to do that: for one people is both plant of nature and one family; only 
that with several branches. Nothing therefore appears more obvious against the purpose of 
governments than the unnatural augmentation of States, being the wild intermixture of species 
of humans and nations under one sceptre. The sceptre of man is far too weak and small as that 
so contradictory parts could be inserted in it; hence they are glued together in a fragile 
machine which one calls State’s machine, without inner life and sympathy of the parts 
towards one another. 
 
This short passage gives an idea of Herder’s pre-romantic and post-‘storm and stress’ 
(Sturm und Drang) style;26 he operates with analogies, metaphors and allusions, not 
exact logical reasoning,27 precisely what Kant would criticise about Herder’s Ideen.28 
But Herder was perhaps the first champion of general synthetic observation and 
holistic contemplation (‘Anschauung’). Although he was an empiricist, he rejected the 
‘cold’ analytical and dissecting scientific examination of man and society, and in this 
                                                 
19  J. G. Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (ed. Martin Bollacher) 
(Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), II, 7, i, at 253; II, 8, ii, at 298. 
20 Herder, Ideen, II, 9, iv, at pp. 369-370. 
21 E.g. Ch. de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, book 19, chapter 10. 
22 A. Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2015) 115, 151, with further references to Kames’s works. 
23  D. Hume, ‘Of National Characters’, in: D. Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 78-92. 
24 Herder, Ideen, II, 7, iii, at pp. 268-270; II, 7, v, at pp. 280-281; II, 8, at pp. 298-299. 
25 Herder, Ideen, II, 9, iv, at pp. 369-370 (my translation). 
26 Compare the passages of similar content in Herder, Ideen, III, 12, vi, at pp. 507-513. 
27 But not without logical reasoning, see the example of logical conclusions in the explanation of the 
grounds (according to Herder, of course) of polygamy in the orient, see Herder, Ideen, II, 8, iv, at pp. 
317-318. 
28 M. Bollacher, in: J. G. Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Frankfurt: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), 905-906; I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, 187. 
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he positioned himself against the French Enlightenment in particular.29 Contrary to 
what an eminent scholar has asserted, 30  Herder was not an opponent of the 
Enlightenment, as has been shown more recently.31  
Herder’s imaginative style of loose associations, sweeping generalisations and 
elegant imprecision is not only extremely difficult to translate into English (something 
that can hardly be held against the English ‘national character’), it also makes it 
complicated to ascertain Herder’s concepts with sufficient precision. The idea of the 
‘national character’ is no exception. How a people’s ‘national character’ can be 
described specifically and what it is shaped by remains hard to establish. Herder says 
that the character of nations depends not only on climate, the geographical situation 
and features of nature (such as mountains), 32  but is also influenced by political 
circumstances.33 The national character is emphatically not based on race; in fact 
Herder sees the term ‘race’ as entirely inappropriate for humans – every people is a 
people with a national culture (National-Bildung), race has no relevance here. 34 
Reading the Ideen, one can distil a certain notion of ‘national character’: a culture 
which is influenced and moulded by climate and topography, genetic predisposition, 
education, tradition, language, myths, poetry,35 arts and science – elements which are 
the result and at the same time the makers of this culture. This culture binds together, 
or forms, a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’, and all peoples or nations are different. From that 
follows a plurality of cultures and a diversity, a challenge to the then prevalent 
Enlightenment view of certain principles of the ‘science of man’ that supposedly 
applied universally. Different as these peoples and their ways of life are, they are still 
equal and equivalent, a point Herder keeps stressing. 36  There are no inferior or 
superior peoples and nations, 37  and historiographers should refrain strictly from 
favouring a particular people.38 The diversity of human peoples is also one reason 
                                                 
29 I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in: I. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, 
Hamann, Herder (ed. Henry Hardy) (London: Pimlico, 2000), 168-242 at 198. Herder was favourable 
to the Scottish Enlightenment in which he saw much more similarity to his own approach, however, 
partly through some erroneous interpretation, see A. Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social 
Theorist (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 147-148. 
30 I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, 195-199. 
31 R. E. Norton, ‘The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment’, (2007) 68(4) Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 635-658. 
32 Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, at p. 677. 
33 Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, iii, at pp. 690-691, in this context in relation to the German peoples. 
34 Herder, Ideen, II, 7, i, at pp. 255-256. 
35 ‘The “genius” of a people manifests itself nowhere better than in the appearance of its speech’, 
Herder, Ideen, II, 9, ii, at p. 353. 
36 E.g. Herder, Ideen, II, 6, iv, at p. 233; II, 7, i, at p. 253; II, 8, iii, at p. 312; II, 8, v, at p. 333; II, 9, iii, 
pp. 358-359. 
37 Consequently, Herder presents the Jews as a people who has preserved its cultural identity and 
national character over hundreds of years of prosecution; and Herder rejects strongly the persecution of 
Jews and what would later be called anti-Semitism, see Herder, Ideen, III, 12, iii, at pp. 483, 490-492; 
IV, 16, v, at p. 702. 
38 Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, vi, at p. 706. 
 6 
why man is not really made for the State, an artificial and ‘inorganic’ institution 
which will hardly lead to man’s happiness.39 The state of nature of man is not war, 
but peace.40 A natural, ‘organic’ government is the state of nature of societies, and 
(wrong) education creates more inequality than nature provides. 41  Diverse and 
dissimilar as these peoples in their seemingly irreconcilable plurality may be, there is 
still a ‘general spirit of Europe’ (Allgemeingeist Europas) which will gradually 
extinguish the national characters. 42  Elsewhere Herder refers to the ‘European 
Republic’ (Europäische Republik).43  
Intellectual and humanist as Herder’s ‘nationalism’44 is, it is still perilous in 
the wrong persons’ hands. Attempts at determining the specific national character of a 
particular people invariably lead to wide generalisations, oversimplifications and 
stereotyping or relatively bland findings which essentially reiterate facts from the 
history of the people in question.45 It is characteristic for Herder that he himself was 
perfectly aware of this danger when he said in his earlier philosophy of history Auch 
eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774) (Yet Another 
Philosophy of History for the Formation of Mankind) that precedes the Ideen: 
‘Nobody in the world feels the weakness of general characterising more than I do. 
One paints a whole people, age, area – whom has one painted?’ 46  But this 
hermeneutic approach with its fine shades of sympathetic understanding at all levels 
got lost in a crude reception of Herder’s thought in the nineteenth century, particularly 
where it was supposed to serve political nationalistic objectives. Herder was used as 
an educational source for the promotion of German nationalism from the 1870s 
onwards with the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, but largely devoid of 
Herder’s essential and multifaceted idea of (universal) humanism.47 Herder was also 
(mis)used by nationalists to justify the rejection of the international organisation of 
the League of Nations in the Weimar Republic,48 and he was invoked for patriotic and 
                                                 
39 Herder, Ideen, II, 8, v, at pp. 333-335. 
40 Herder, Ideen, II, 8, iv, at p. 316. 
41 Herder, Ideen, II, 9, iv, at pp. 362, 367. Herder’s indebtedness to Rousseau is obvious here. 
42 Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, vi, at pp. 705-706. 
43 Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, at p. 678. 
44 It is a form of nationalism, see I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, 179, 205-206, but it is 
anachronistic to equate this ‘nationalism’ with the nineteenth century nationalism and present 
nationalist movements. 
45 See, for example, for the first case, Herder’s characterisation of the Saxons, Normans and Danes, 
Herder, Ideen, IV, 18, iv, at p. 789, for the second case, Herder’s remarks about the Slavonic peoples, 
Herder, Ideen, IV, 16, iv, at p. 696-699. 
46 J. G. Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, Hans-Dietrich 
Irmscher (ed.) (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012), 28. 
47 B. Becker, Herder-Rezeption in Deutschland (St. Ingbert: Röhrig Verlag, 1987), 79-90. 
48 Ibid., at 123. 
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racist conceptions from the late nineteenth century onwards through the Weimar 
Republic and the Third Reich.49  
Why is then reference made at all to this old and rather complicated German 
thinker who may invite objectionable interpretations? Because Herder does help 
explaining some movements and developments among the nations within the 
European Union today. The ubiquitous critical stance in Europe from Britain to 
Poland towards the European Union and the movement against economic and political 
globalisation in favour of a national, domestic, seemingly manageable world steeped 
in a perceived national tradition and culture shows features of Herder’s ‘national 
character’. Thus there is a notion of ‘national character’, but in contrast to Herder, I 
consider such a national character not as coming from a mystical alchemistic source 
of nature, culture and tradition, language, education and art. The national character is 
rather deliberately created, a political construct by man, sometimes left to the forces 
of modern society, such as politics, economics, media, the arts and sciences, 
sometimes deliberately imposed and fabricated for political ends. Thus the national 
character is invented by man and at the same time given some spiritual force beyond 
the powers of man so that it escapes rational scrutiny and critique, in the same way as 
religion. Man creates the national character by behaving as if there were one. And so 
it exists indeed, man-made, often irrational, sometimes even through specific 
purposeful acts, but disavowed as man-made. Try to convince a Scot that he is 
actually English, or a Pole that he is German or Russian. (He will be quick to point 
out what he is not, but will typically struggle if you insist on an answer what he 
actually is, what ‘Scottishness’ or ‘Polishness’ is supposed to be and what national 
identity does or should consist of.) If the European Union is to have a future, it cannot 
ignore the existence of national character and national identity, however questionable 
it is as to its pedigree, its meaning and as to its rationality. Law is an important part in 
the making and maintenance of such a national character and identity.  
Herder had very little to say about law. The only relevant passage can be 
found in Herder’s earlier work Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte. Herder states 
that a universal law as a means of nation building is much less useful than is 
commonly thought because a universal law can only provide broad common 
principles which cannot take account of the individual characteristics of specific 
peoples.50  
The ‘Herderian’ jurist in Germany was Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-
1861). Herder’s influence on Savigny was profound; his ‘Volksgeistlehre’ (‘spirit of 
the people doctrine’) is imbued with Herder’s idea of a national character. For 
                                                 
49 Ibid., at 115-117, 127, 133. 
50 J. G. Herder, Auch eine Philosophie, 66-67. 
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Savigny there is an organic connection of law with the nature and character of a 
people, and this remains with the evolution of the people throughout the course of 
history. The actual foundation of law is the common consciousness of an individual 
people. Codification of law in a (civil) code is detrimental to the organic body of the 
law and its legal science because it detaches law from the specific people’s 
consciousness, history and culture. The law of a nation is peculiar to a people’s 
individual national character, shaped by tradition, history, education, literature and the 
like; it is not ahistorical, universal or generic as the Enlightenment would see law (at 
least in Savigny’s interpretation). Consequently Savigny opposed the codification 
movement in the first half of the nineteenth century and the then already existing 
Prussian, French and Austrian civil codes.51  
Savigny’s argument is clearly Herder’s understanding of a national character 
and identity applied to the origin and evolution of law.52 It is therefore strange if a 
comparative lawyer hails Herder as a kind of proto-postmodernist particularist thinker 
and at the same time rejects Savigny as a conservative German nationalist 
ethnocentric jurist who was supposedly hostile to comparative law.53 It is equally 
curious if another comparative lawyer, notably from Germany, refers to Savigny of all 
people when canvassing for a unifying Europe-wide civil code based on a ‘European’ 
ius commune and legal science.54 This only underlines that Herder’s multifaceted and 
ambiguous thought can be used as an authority for contradictory conclusions and, in 
any case, is potentially dangerous material, especially if used by populist politicians. 
The problems in relation to a European civil code55 re-appear with the harmonisation 
of European copyright law. A difference is that EU copyright law is already much 
more harmonised as European Private Law, largely based on international 
conventions (some dating back to the nineteenth century), and copyright 
harmonisation deals with a much narrower, specialist area than the EU civil code 
projects. However, while with regard to private law harmonisation the problem is 
manifest, in the case of copyright law it starts to emerge. The vigorous drive for 
further integration of copyright law at EU level may no longer be supported by the 
existing international harmonisation. Furthermore, only because there is already 
                                                 
51 A. Rahmatian, ‘Friedrich Carl v. Savigny’s Beruf and Volksgeistlehre’, (2007) 28 The Journal of 
Legal History, 1-29, at 5-7 with references to Savigny’s German text. 
52 For extensive criticism of Savigny’s Volksgeistlehre, see A. Rahmatian, ‘Friedrich Carl v. Savigny’s 
Beruf and Volksgeistlehre’, (2007) 28 The Journal of Legal History, 1-29, at 9-13, 17-18. 
53 P. Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’, in: P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds), Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge: CUP), 260-261 (n. 66), 266, 268. 
54 R. Zimmermann, ‘Savigny’s Legacy. Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a 
European Legal Science’, (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review, 576-605. 
55 The (rather academic) project of a European Civil Code never obtained a clear endorsement from the 
EU, see S. Whittaker, ‘A framework for European contract law?’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review, 
616-647, at 623.  
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harmonisation in place does not mean that it is necessarily acceptable to EU Member 
States, so that a movement against the EU agenda may seek to dismantle existing 
harmonisation even where it has been a reasonable achievement. 
After this detour into intellectual history one can formulate for legislative 
projects at European level a certain paradox which is inherent in Herder’s idea of 
diverse cultural unity of humanity itself: 56  the more one pursues integration, 
harmonisation and unification of national laws across Europe, the more one impedes 
and endangers the fabric and framework of a union of European states. Further legal 
unification prompts a tendency of the EU Member States to move away from one 
another. Further (imposed) unity causes further diversity, and a certain level of 
diversity effects unity. 57  This somewhat dialectical process can be called the 
‘Herderian paradox’. The unity through, and within, diversity is then indeed what 
Herder saw as the overarching humanist culture which unites mankind (and not only 
in Europe). The reason for the tendency away from the European Union because of 
further harmonisation of national laws is that people perceive their laws as a part and 
expression of their ‘national character’, therefore a certain plurality of laws among 
different peoples is inevitable. One will have to disagree with Herder and see this 
national character as a man-made, and deliberately created, political and socio-
economic phenomenon, often fabricated and imposed, but one has to be pragmatic 
and recognise its existence, even if there is no beautifully mystical origin which may 
give its coarse nature a noble lustre.  
Thus with regard to European copyright law one can say that insistence on a 
harmonisation or even unification of fundamental concepts of copyright only 
contributes to a further disintegration of an already weakened European Union. This 
will be shown with the examples of work, originality, moral rights and exceptions. 
One should not underestimate copyright and dismiss it as a small area of the law with 
little relevance within the huge body of legislation of the EU. Especially the moral 
rights are easier to understand than, say, technical banking law (including the 
measures for the rescuing of the banks), and can therefore be communicated and 
packaged more easily in political discourse, irrespective of whether the concepts of 
copyright are really understood. ‘Are the paternity right and integrity right not legal 
safeguards for a specific national character and culture as they manifest themselves in 
literature and the arts?’, populists may argue. In a world of social media symbols can 
be conveyed much more easily than complex content that requires reading and study. 
                                                 
56 ‘Unity in difference’, see I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, 177. 
57 This idea of an underlying unity in the appearing (not only apparent) diversity or variety can also be 
found in Goethe’s idea of the archetypal plant (‘Urpflanze’), and this approach would also influence 
Alexander von Humboldt. See J. W. v. Goethe, ‘Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen’, in: Werke. 
Hamburger Ausgabe, vol. 13 (1982), 64, 579. Goethe was of course profoundly influenced by Herder. 
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Symbols can denote, highlight, simplify and mask, like trade marks. For example, 
even the preservation of the symbolic, but legally irrelevant specific Scottish 
banknotes (against their replacement by banknotes from the Bank of England) was 
worth a warning statement against the UK central government by the nationalist First 
Minister of Scotland when their abolition was discussed following the collapse of 
Northern Rock bank in 2008.58 Leaving aside the legal-technical difficulties of the 
harmonisation of copyright and the interpretation of European copyright law vis-à-vis 
national laws, in the current political climate it may be advisable not to press for 
further integration and unification of copyright to avoid the encouragement of 
political centrifugal forces. 
The present endorsement of legal particularism and relative autonomy under a 
uniting power of all-encompassing legal principles (especially human rights) is 
incidentally not a neo-romantic or postmodernist approach that invokes Herder as a 
supposed prominent critic of the Enlightenment. It has its roots squarely in the 
Enlightenment itself, more precisely in Montesquieu:59  
 
There are certain ideas of uniformity, which sometimes strike great geniuses (for they even 
affected Charlemagne) but infallibly make an impression on little souls. They find therein a 
kind of perfection they recognise, because it is impossible for them not to discover it; the 
same weights by the market authorities, the same measures in commerce, the same laws in the 
State, the same religions in all parts of the country. But is this always right, and without 
exception? Is the evil of changing always less than that of suffering? And does not a greatness 
of genius consist rather in distinguishing between those cases in which uniformity is requisite, 
and those in which there is a necessity for differences? … If the peoples observe the laws, is it 
relevant whether they observe the same? 
 
 
An illustration of the ‘Herderian paradox’: The problems with EU-wide 
harmonisation of copyright law  
 
The agenda of the European Union continues to be directed towards further 
harmonisation of copyright law. The European Parliament passed a resolution on 9 
July 2015, 60 in which it confirmed that, especially in view of digital technology, 
consumers should not face geographical restrictions of services which conflict with 
                                                 
58 First Minister Alex Salmond, The Scotsman, June 11, 2008: ‘This is great news. It’s a victory for 
Scotland and its financial sector. I’m delighted the Treasury have dropped their ludicrous proposals 
that threatened the very existence of Scottish banknotes. Let’s hope they’ve finally learnt their lesson 
and never jeopardise our banknotes again.’ 
59 Ch. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, book 19, chapter 18 (ed. David W. Carrithers) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 378 (with slight changes of the translation by the author). 
60 European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2015 on the implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society (2014/2256 (INI)). 
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the objectives of the Information Society Directive61 to implement the four freedoms 
of the internal market. Furthermore, multi-territorial licensing according to the recent 
Directive on Collective Management of Copyright62 should be simplified, and film 
production and financing depending on exclusive territorial licensing should be 
facilitated by taking account of cultural specificities of the markets and cultural 
diversity.63 At the same time the resolution ‘calls for a reaffirmation of the principle 
of territoriality’ (in the context of fair remuneration) and notes ‘that the right to 
private property is one of the fundaments of modern society’64 which creates, apart 
from interesting political implications, some tension with a Europe-wide 
harmonisation of copyright law. After all, intellectual property rights as a form of 
property rights have territoriality as an essential feature, and territoriality is a critical 
hurdle in the harmonisation project. 65  The recently proposed EU-Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Market also seeks to tackle the problem of territoriality in a 
digital environment in relation to exceptions and limitations within digital and cross-
border uses in the area of education, text and data mining for scientific research, and 
preservation of cultural heritage. Again, the property nature of copyright has been 
stressed.66 
The proprietary quality of intellectual property rights becomes difficult with 
enforcement and the fragmentation of the (online) licencing market. 67 In a linked 
context both problems have been addressed with the Directives on Enforcement68 and 
on Collective Management of Copyright. 69  These are instances of what property 
theorists would refer to as the right to exclude (enforcement) and the right to use 
(multi-territorial licencing) which are intrinsic to a property right, such as an 
                                                 
61 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, see also Recitals (3) and (4). 
62 Directive 2014/26/EU of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights 
and multi–territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, OJ L. 
84/72. 
63 EU Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015, Paras. 3, 9, 12, 13. 
64 Paras. 7 and 50. 
65 E. Rosati, ‘Towards an EU-wide copyright? (Judicial) pride and (legislative) prejudice’, (2013) IPQ 
47-68, at 65-66; T. Cook and E. Derclaye, ‘An EU Copyright Code; what and how, if ever?’, (2011), 
IPQ 3, 259-269, at 262-263; Ch. Geiger et al. ‘The Resolution of the European Parliament of July 9, 
2015: paving the way (finally) for a copyright reform in the European Union?’, (2015) EIPR 37(11) 
683-701, at 686, questioning the role of territoriality for fair remuneration. 
66 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market (COM (2016) 593 final), Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 2, 9, Recital (5), Arts. 1 and 2. 
67  C. Seville, ‘Intellectual Property’, (2011) 60(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1039-1055, at 1042. 
68 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property, and Recitals (7)-(9). 
69 Directive 2014/26/EU of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights 
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, OJ L 
84/72. A predecessor of this Directive was the (non-binding) Commission Recommendation 
2005/737/EC of 18 May 2005 on Collective Cross–border Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services [2005] OJ L 276/54. 
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intellectual property right.70 Since copyright is conceptualised as a property right,71 a 
harmonisation of copyright systems in Europe will find it difficult to overcome its 
constitutive territorial element. International conventions, beginning with the Berne 
Convention, the factual effects of the internet and digitisation, and the existing 
approximation of special aspects of copyright by EU legislation have watered down 
the territoriality principle somewhat in reality, but the lex loci protectionis still 
stands. 72  It can only be removed at European Union level if a strictly unified 
copyright law for the whole European Union were enacted, a property right with the 
EU as a whole as its territory and probably even as a separate regime, like the 
Community Trade Mark. Then, however, one will have to determine the content and 
constituting factors of this unified copyright-property right, realistically in a series of 
compromises between the national jurisdictions of the Member States in the 
unification process. That will be difficult, but an illustration of the ‘Herderian 
paradox’. The following section highlights only a few particularly problematic issues. 
 
The scope and content of the concept of ‘work’ 
The extent and meaning of the technical term ‘work’ is an important element in a 
Europe-wide harmonisation of copyright. Currently the definition of ‘work’ is 
arguably in the competence of the Member States. 73 Is the copyright-work to be 
ascertained according to a conclusive list of separate work categories, as classically in 
Britain,74 or does the law provide a demonstrative list of types of work without being 
exhaustive, such as in France or Germany?75 Does the law presume a creation being a 
work if that creation is ‘original’ in the copyright sense, as some more recent 
decisions of the ECJ/CJEU suggest? 76 This CJEU’s interpretation is closer to the 
European author’s rights approach, but it is not the same, and actually a circular 
argument: the creation must exist as a work if it is to be assessed as original, and the 
originality must confer on the creation the status of being a work. This circularity 
                                                 
70 A. Rahmatian, ‘Intellectual Property and the Concept of Dematerialised Property’ in: S. Bright (ed.), 
Modern Studies in Property Law, Vol. 6 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 361-383, at 366-367, 
373-375. 
71  This is in reality so everywhere despite formal conceptual differences (e.g. the German 
Immaterialgüterrecht) or academic discourse about whether copyright is really a property right, see 
discussion in A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011), 25-35, 60-67. 
72 For the international situation, see G. B. Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a private international intellectual 
property law: The demise of territoriality?’ (2009) 51 W. & Mary L. Rev. 711–800. 
73 E. Derclaye, ‘The Court of Justice copyright case law: quo vadis?’, (2014) 36(11) EIPR 716-732, at 
719. 
74 CDPA 1988, ss. 3-8; L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 
2014), 59-61. 
75 France: CPT 1992, Art. 112-2; Germany: § 2 (1) Author’s Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1965. 
76 Especially Football Association Premier League and others v. QC Leisure and others, and Murphy 
v. Media Protection Services (C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR 1321, paras. 96-97. Perhaps also Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] FSR 18 (Case C-
393/09), para. 46. 
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appears strongly in Football Association/Murphy: ‘[The claimant] cannot claim 
copyright in the Premier League matches themselves, as they cannot be classified as 
works. To be so classified, the subject-matter concerned would have to be original in 
the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation [with reference to Infopaq].’77 
In other decisions the connection work-originality is less strong. 
Contrary to the CJEU’s view in some judgments (at least according to some 
interpretations 78 ), there cannot be originality on its own in the author’s rights 
countries either. Every creation must materialise in form of a work to obtain 
protection; 79  this is ultimately an application of the idea-expression dichotomy 80 
which also exists in the author’s rights countries,81 and which the ECJ has stated 
fairly recently as well.82 The work represents the physically realised expression of an 
idea. Strictly speaking, it represents, not is this realisation, because the work is only 
an instance or social reifier of the expressed idea.83 Music is a good example: the idea 
in the copyright sense, melody, harmony, rhythm, condenses to an idea in the 
philosophical sense, a specific melody/harmony/rhythm in a composer’s head. It 
manifests itself in a physical expression in the outside world, through sound, and/or a 
score in which the music is written down as a performance instruction: this expression 
is the work in the copyright sense. This is the same in the copyright and the author’s 
rights systems: the difference is only that the copyright system of the UK requires 
recording/fixation of this physical expression,84 for example in form of a musical 
score, while in the author’s rights countries the fixation is facultative,85 but in reality 
inevitable for obtaining evidence in a copyright infringement trial. In both cases we 
have a creation which would qualify as a musical work, whereby the work is not the 
score (or, in case of a poem, not the printed paper in a book), but the score is one 
instance of the manifested materialisation of the work. This is the starting point for 
establishing whether that work is also original.  
                                                 
77 Football Association Premier League and others v. QC Leisure and others, and Murphy v. Media 
Protection Services (C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR 1321, paras. 96 and 97. 
78 See discussion in E. Rosati, ‘Towards an EU-wide copyright? (Judicial) pride and (legislative) 
prejudice’, (2013) IPQ 47-68, at 60. 
79 M. Vivant and J.-M. Bruguière, Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, 2nd ed. (2013), 220; M. Rehbinder, 
Urheberrecht, 16th ed. (2010), 67. 
80 TRIPS Agreement 1994, Art. 9 (2), Directive 2009/24/EC (Software Directive), Art. 1 (2), US 
Copyright Act 1976, § 102 (b). 
81 M. Vivant and J.-M. Bruguière, Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, 2nd ed. (2013), 130. 
82 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] FSR 18 
(Case C-393/09) [2011] ECDR 3, para. 49; (indirectly) Football Association Premier League and 
others v. QC Leisure and others, and Murphy v. Media Protection Services (C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR 
1321, especially para. 98; Football Dataco Ltd and others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others (Case C-
604/10) [2012] ECDR 10, para. 39. 
83 A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011), 17-18. 
84 CDPA 1988, s. 3 (2). 
85 There are exceptions: In the UK broadcasts need no fixation, in France choreographic works need 
fixation. 
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If the CJEU is understood as not distinguishing between work and originality, 
but considers these two concepts as united in one as ‘original work’, this creates a 
theoretical muddle, and it is doctrinally doubtful because the Berne Convention also 
presupposes a certain work-originality duality (though it is silent as to the criteria for 
originality and keeps the fixation requirement expressly open86), otherwise its non-
exhaustive list of ‘literary and artistic works’ would be superfluous. 87  A better 
interpretation of the CJEU decisions sees them as only establishing that the list of 
work categories does not have to be a closed one.88 The model European Copyright 
Code drafted by the Wittem Group in 2010 proposed the same solution of a non-
exhaustive list.89 However, the practical effect of this change is limited. In the UK the 
special categories of literary, dramatic work etc. are either very broad by virtue of the 
statute itself (literary or artistic work90), or the courts were usually rather generous in 
ascertaining the limits of the categories.91 It is unlikely that something broadly from 
the creative-artistic or scientific sector92 does not fit into any of the existing work 
classifications. Usually ‘new’ types of work are combinations of established work 
categories.93 The excluding factor is rather not qualitative, but quantitative, because 
the work in question does not cross the de minimis threshold.94 The interpretation of 
‘work’ in some of the CJEU decisions can be seen as a certain undesirable 
imprecision in relation to the use and shaping of constitutive elements of copyright 
which may introduce, involuntarily and accidentally, a Herderian ‘unity in diversity’ 
simply for lack of clear guidance by the CJEU. But it could also be the start of a 
unification by case law which may stand against both copyright and author’s rights 
systems in Europe. The potential problem is more visible in the case of originality. 
 
 
                                                 
86 Berne Convention, Art. 2 (2). 
87 Berne Convention, Art. 2 (1), (2), (5).  
88 That may also apply to the UK: L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2014), 61-62. 
89 Wittem Project, European Copyright Code, Article 1.1 (2): ‘The following [works] in particular …’ 
(emphasis added). 
90 CDPA 1988, ss. 3 (1) (a)-(d) and 4. 
91 For example in Hi-Tech Autoparts v. Towergate Two Ltd. (nos. 1 and 2) [2002] FSR 254 and 270 
(moulds for car rubber floor mats as engravings), Norowzian v. Arks (No. 2) [2000] EMLR 67, at 73 
(dramatic work capable of being performed also as a film). However, this was not always so: Creation 
Records v. News Group [1997] EMLR 444 (independent photographing of an arranged scene); 
Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208 (Star Wars storm trooper helmet is not a 
sculpture).   
92 Compare the umbrella term of the Berne Convention, Art. 2 (1): ‘literary and artistic works’ include 
every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain. 
93 On the way how fashion could be covered within the closed list of work categories in the UK, see I. 
Silverman, ‘Copyright and fashion: friends at last?’ (2013) 35(11) EIPR, 637-645, at 639-640, 645. 
94 Cramp v. Smythson [1944] AC 329, effectively also Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance [1982] RPC 69 
(one single word: no literary work, whether that is a decision on qualitative or quantitative grounds is 
debatable). 
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The content of the concept of ‘originality’  
The understanding of the concept of originality in copyright is at the centre of the 
development of a harmonising impact of CJEU case law on copyright. Otherwise 
unified areas only comprise rather special issues, such as the question of copyright 
levies for the use of private copying exceptions as fair compensation.95 The CJEU has 
declared the concept of ‘fair compensation’ (deriving from the Rental and Lending 
Right Directive96) as an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted 
uniformly in all the Member States that have introduced a private copying exception, 
since this concept does not contain any reference to national laws of the Member 
States.97 Very recently the CJEU stretched the ‘autonomous concept’ considerably in 
the EGEDA decision, in which the CJEU ruled that the scheme of fair compensation 
for private copying should not be funded only from the general state budget, 98 
although the Information Society Directive in Art. 5 (2) (b) is silent about that, and 
there is arguably no regulatory lacuna. The CJEU has also stated that parody is an 
autonomous concept of EU law.99 
Apparently originality in copyright law is now evolving towards an 
autonomous concept of EU law, but this is more problematic, both as to its genesis 
and as to its content. The narrowly confined special areas (fair compensation, parody) 
are ultimately based on specific EU-directives and their interpretation by the CJEU, 
and are easy to define and demarcate.100 In contrast, the development of an EU law of 
copyright originality, starting with Infopaq,101 derives from the CJEU’s problematic 
drawing together of several EU-directives dealing with special issues of copyright law 
(‘transversal’ or ‘notional’ approach102), and from a particular interpretation of the 
                                                 
95 A. Strowel, ‘Towards a European Copyright Law: Four Issues to Consider’, in: I. Stamatoudi, P. 
Torremans (eds.), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014), 1127-
1154, at 1130. 
96 Directive 2006/115/EC, Art. 8 (2). 
97 Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) (C-467/08) [2010] ECR 
I-271, para. 33; Discretion of the EU Member State within the limits of EU law to determine the 
obligation under the Directive (fair compensation under Art. 5 (2) (b) of the Information Society 
Directive 2001/29) in the absence of sufficiently precise community criteria, Amazon and others v. 
Austro-Mechana GmbH (C-521/11) [2014] 1 CMLR 11, para. 21.  
98 EGEDA (C-470/14), 9 June 2016, paras. 38, 42. 
99 Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v. Helena Vandersteen and Others (C-201/13) [2014] 
ECDR 21, paras. 14-17. 
100 In these specific instances this is in effect still so, although the interpretation by the ECJ does not 
necessarily confine itself to one single Directive but combines several for its findings, for example in 
Vereniging van Educatieve en Wetenschappelijke Auteurs (VEWA) v. Belgische Staat (C-271/10) 
[2011] ECDR 19, para. 27: ‘… regard being had for the requirements deriving from the unity and 
coherence of the legal order of the European Union, that concept of remuneration must be interpreted 
in the light of the rules and principles established by all of the directives on intellectual property, as 
interpreted by the Court.’ 
101 Infopaq (Case C-5/08), paras. 27-28.  
102 Ch. Geiger and F. Schönherr, ‘The Information Society Directive, art. 5’, in: I. Stamatoudi, P. 
Torremans (eds.), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014), 434-
484, at 456. 
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wording in these directives of ‘author’s own intellectual creation’103 – on its own an 
empty definition of originality.104 In this way, the CJEU regards these instances of a 
definition of originality in these specific directives as concrete applications of a 
general principle of a non-existent comprehensive copyright code, and extracts from 
these the meaning of originality in general. Thus one could argue that the CJEU’s 
supposedly autonomous concept of EU originality is not drawn from a comprehensive 
statutory basis in form of a directive or regulation (embodying general copyright law, 
such as the Trade Marks Directive105 for trade mark law). There was no precedent in 
EU law either – only possibly influential definitions in national laws of Member 
States – which could fill the empty vessel of the definition of originality (‘the author’s 
own intellectual creation’) with meaningful content. The CJEU case law that brought 
about this development has been dealt with extensively, so that a detailed discussion 
need not be repeated here.106  
The fairly broad Information Society Directive 2001/29 obviously serves as 
the best basis for the development of ‘autonomous concepts of EU-law’ as kernels for 
a future unified copyright law by CJEU case law. In Infopaq the ECJ observed that in 
relation to the provision in question, Art. 2 of the Information Society Directive, a 
provision of EU law that makes no express reference to the law of the Member States 
for the purpose of determining their meaning and scope must normally be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the EU, especially in view of 
recitals (6) and (21) of the Directive. Therefore Member States cannot define 
individually concepts set out in the Directive (here: ‘reproduction in part’ in Art. 
2).107 The Information Society Directive refers to ‘works’108 which are only protected 
if they are original. At EU level, three Directives define originality as the author’s 
own intellectual creation 109  in relation to computer programmes, databases and 
photographs. 110  The ECJ then concludes that there is copyright protection for a 
                                                 
103 Directive 96/9/EC (Database Directive) Art. 3 (1); Directive 2009/24/EC (Software Directive), Art. 
1 (3), Directive 2006/116/EC (Term Directive), Art. 6. 
104 A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK Copyright Law: The old “Skill and Labour” doctrine under 
pressure’, (2013) 44 IIC 4-34, at 11-12, 18. 
105 Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks. 
106 E. Derclaye, ‘Case Comment: Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): 
wonderful or worrisome? The impact of the ECJ ruling in Infopaq on UK copyright law’, (2010) 32(5) 
EIPR, 247-251; L. Bently, ‘Harmonisation by stealth: The role of the ECJ’, at the CRID/IvIR 
Conference, European Parliament, Brussels, 13 January 2012; E. Rosati, ‘Towards an EU-wide 
copyright? (Judicial) pride and (legislative) prejudice’, (2013) IPQ 47-68; A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality 
in UK Copyright Law: The old “Skill and Labour” doctrine under pressure, (2013) 44 IIC 4-34. 
107 Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECDR 16 (Case C-5/08), paras. 27-29. 
108 Directive 2001/29/EC, Art. 2 (a). 
109 In Art. 1(3) of Directive 2009/24/EC (originally Directive 91/250): Software Directive; Art. 3 (1) of 
Directive 96/9: Database Directive; Art. 6 of Directive 2006/116/EC: Term Directive. 
110 Infopaq (Case C-5/08), paras. 33, 35. 
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‘work’111 only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its 
author’s own intellectual creation.112 
Subsequent cases confirm this approach and elaborate on the definition of 
originality, particularly Football Association Premier League/Murphy which may 
support the view discussed before that the CJEU regards ‘original work’ as a single 
concept and not as two separate terms,113 Bezpečnostní,114 and Painer.115 The latter 
case gave the concept of ‘European’ originality its clearest contours, expressed in 
relation to a portrait photograph:116  
 
[Following Infopaq], copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter, such as a 
photograph, which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation. As 
stated in [recital 16 of the Term Directive], an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it 
reflects the author’s personality. That is the case if the author was able to express his creative 
abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices […]. As regards a 
portrait photograph, the photographer can make free and creative choices in several ways and 
at various points in its production. […] By making those various choices, the author of a 
portrait photograph can stamp the work created with his ‘personal touch’. 
 
This decision is not without some unexpected creativity. The definition of ‘own 
intellectual creation’ as reflecting the author’s personality is based on a Recital of the 
Term Directive in which photographs are, somewhat accidentally, included: the main 
provision, however, does not define ‘own intellectual creation’.117 Nor does the Term 
Directive make any statements about originality beyond the work category of 
photographs, and even within this category there is a proviso. Recital 16 itself says 
that a photographic work is original ‘if it is the author’s own intellectual creation 
reflecting his personality, no other criteria such as merit or purpose being taken into 
account’ (own emphasis). This rather reads as a contrasting statement to emphasise 
the boundary to works which the following sentence considers: ‘The protection of 
other photographs should be left to national law.’ That refers to the neighbouring 
rights particularly in Germany for photographs which do not fulfil the required level 
for originality to be protected by core author’s rights law for photographic works.118 
                                                 
111 ‘Work’ according to the meaning in Art 2 (a) of the Information Society Directive. 
112 Infopaq (Case C-5/08), para. 37. 
113 Football Association Premier League and others v. QC Leisure and others, and Murphy v. Media 
Protection Services (C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR 1321, especially paras. 96-97. Perhaps also 
Bezpečnostní, para. 46: ‘… the graphic user interface [the work at issue] can, as a work, be protected 
by copyright if it is its author’s own intellectual creation.’ (emphasis added). 
114 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] FSR 18 
(Case C-393/09) [2011] ECDR 3, paras. 45-46, 51. 
115 Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag 
Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG, Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung 
GmbH & Co KG (C-145/10). 
116 Painer (C-145/10), paras. 87-92. 
117 Directive 2006/116/EC, Art. 6.  
118 § 72 German Author’s Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1965; M. Rehbinder, Urheberrecht, 16th 
ed. (2010), 87, 319. 
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The recital clarifies that these other types of photographs remain protected according 
to national law and EU law does not interfere. The UK does not have this distinction 
between copyright photographs and neighbouring right photographs: why should 
Painer-originality have to apply to all photographs in the UK, while in Germany this 
is not necessarily the case? (The boundary between authorial and neighbouring right 
photographs is difficult to draw.119) And why does the Infopaq-Painer originality, 
seemingly an autonomous concept of EU law, have to apply to all types of copyright 
works, although only photographs are specifically mentioned in the Term Directive? 
The Database and the Software Directives cover databases and computer programs 
with the same originality definition of ‘own intellectual creation’, and these works are 
considered in Bezpečnostní (computer programs, graphic user interface), Football 
Dataco (copyright protection of databases alongside the sui generis database right),120 
SAS (functionalities of a computer program and computer language).121 These cases 
reiterate the Infopaq-Painer originality definition.122 Other works are not mentioned 
anywhere, except the passing reference to phonograms, films and broadcasts in Art. 2, 
the reproduction right provision of the Information Society Directive.  
The Football Dataco decision is relevant particularly for the originality 
criterion of the copyright system of the UK because it declared that ‘the significant 
labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot as such justify such a 
protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of the 
data which that database contains.’123 This means that the classical ‘skill and labour’ 
criterion for originality in UK copyright law no longer suffices (for all types of 
work?) and has to be supplemented with the vague ‘own intellectual creation’ 
criterion, which is directed at some change to UK law, though nobody knows exactly 
in which way. The Advocate-General’s opinion was here more explicit, but more 
openly against the tradition of the UK: ‘copyright protection is conditional upon the 
database being characterised by a ‘creative’ aspect, and it is not sufficient that the 
creation of the database required labour and skill’, and ‘intellectual creation’ … 
‘echoes a formula which is typical of the continental copyright124 tradition.’125 That 
such moves eventually seek to eliminate legal diversity by imposing a different, but 
not exact, concept is obvious. Indeed, the CJEU decisions have been understood in 
                                                 
119 G. Schulze, in: Th. Dreier and G. Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar, 4th ed. (Munich: C. H. 
Beck), § 72 n. 2, at 1157. 
120 Football Dataco Ltd and others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others (Case C-604/10) [2012] ECDR 10. 
121 SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd (C-406/10) [2012] ECDR 22. 
122 Bezpečnostní, paras. 45-46; Football Dataco, paras. 37-38; SAS, para. 67. 
123 Football Dataco Ltd and others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others (Case C-604/10) [2012] ECDR 10, 
paras. 42, 46. 
124 ‘Continental copyright’ tradition is a flawed term, but in the original Italian of the Advocate-
General’s opinion it says correctly: ‘tradizione continentale del diritto d’autore’, at para. 37. 
125 Opinion of the Advocate-General Mengozzi (Case C-604/10), paras. 35, 37. 
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this way and not too favourably received by a number of lawyers in the UK. 
Certainly, what labels itself ‘own intellectual creation’ or ‘creativity’ appears as a 
different concept compared with the UK approach, but can only be regarded as a 
technical legal term, because the preparation of a database is by no means a creative 
act as one would ordinarily understand it.  
The further definitions that the CJEU provides for ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’ do not give as much information as one would need for a judicial 
development of the meaning of originality in EU law. Furthermore, they are likely to 
be adapted in accordance with individual national laws and legal traditions in the 
respective Member States. Thus the desired judicial harmonisation may not really be 
achieved. This starts with the problem that the term ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’ does not mean anything if it is not filled with practical case law and such 
case law does not exist at EU level. In fact it cannot exist, because the reference to the 
CJEU for preliminary rulings provides authoritative interpretation of EU law126 and 
cannot make factual decisions for the concrete case; that is assigned to the national 
courts. We do not know from the ECJ’s decision in Infopaq whether eleven 
subsequent words a search engine extracts are original and therefore protected by 
copyright, we are only given the legal rule for the assessment.127 But harmonisation 
requires equal realisation of the legal rule across the Member States. An abstract rule, 
either in a Directive or in form of a more concrete rendering by the CJEU cannot 
achieve that with the complex and multifaceted concept of copyright-originality. It is 
not surprising that the conceptually different laws of the UK and of France have no 
statutory definition for originality at all, but rely on case law. 128 Germany has a 
statutory definition,129 but also relies on case law in reality.130 The main element of 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’ is that of ‘choice’ and Painer explains further how 
that can be realised in case of a portrait photograph:131 
 
In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject’s pose and 
the lighting. When taking a portrait photograph, he can choose the framing, the angle of view 
and the atmosphere created. Finally, when selecting the snapshot, the photographer may 
choose from a variety of developing techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where 
appropriate, use computer software. 
 
                                                 
126 Art 267 TFEU.  
127 Infopaq (C-5/08), paras. 48, 51. 
128 See, for France, M. Vivant and J.-M. Bruguière, Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, 2nd ed. (2013), 232. 
129 § 2 (2) German Author’s Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1965. 
130  U. Loewenheim in G. Schricker, U. Loewenheim (eds) Urheberrecht. Kommentar (2010), 
‘Einleitung’, note 6. 
131 Painer (C-145/10), para. 91. 
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In short, the criterion is that of artistically irrelevant choice.132 The exercise of human 
choice can be interpreted as conferring a ‘personal touch’ on the work. But that is also 
realised in form of especially ‘judgement’ in the classical British understanding of 
originality as ‘skill and labour’.133 One could rephrase the findings of the CJEU for 
the UK as the author being required to apply his judgement to make selections and 
choices in the creation of the work to obtain originality. Through these choices he 
expresses creative ability, irrespective of whether this ‘creativity’ has any artistic 
merit.134 That only moves the UK towards the US approach in Feist,135 but it does not 
turn the UK into an author’s rights country, as some academics have indicated.136 The 
author’s rights countries protect the work through the protection of its author’s 
personality, while the copyright systems protect the author through the protection of 
his work as property.137 The practical difference is, however, very limited. Thus one 
can interpret the concept of originality in UK copyright law in outward conformity 
with the CJEU decisions on originality (which might – simplistically – be regarded as 
having more an author’s rights flavour), and so achieve at least ostensibly 
harmonisation. It is unclear whether that approach was intended by the CJEU – if one 
can establish at all what was intended. Other countries may do the same as the UK: if 
that is regarded a harmonisation, then the CJEU was successful, if that is not the idea 
of harmonisation, then the respective attempts of the CJEU have failed. 
However, it is obvious that, in line with the agenda of the EU towards 
harmonisation and unification of laws to enable and support the common market, the 
CJEU seeks to achieve a harmonisation of the understanding of originality across all 
areas of copyright and across all jurisdictions of the Member States. The fact that the 
exact extent and meaning of this harmonised EU originality is rather vague at present, 
does not quell the pressure towards an overriding concept which may be perceived as 
a forceful intrusion in Member States’ laws without their parliamentary consent. A 
complex concept such as originality in copyright that has grown in a particular 
cultural and legal tradition with an individual body of case law is probably unsuitable 
for proper harmonisation across the EU.138 It is telling that the Wittem European 
                                                 
132 Incidentally, here the ECJ is a child of its time, because the central principle of prevalent ‘neo-
liberalism’ is also that of (politically and socially) irrelevant choice in the marketplace. 
133 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, at 609-610, per Peterson 
J; Ladbroke (Football) v. William Hill (Football) [1964] 1 WLR 273. 
134 I have suggested this interpretation in A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK Copyright Law: The old 
“Skill and Labour” doctrine under pressure, (2013) 44 IIC 4-34, at 30. 
135 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co Inc. 499 US 340. 
136 E. Derclaye, ‘Case Comment: Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): 
wonderful or worrisome? The impact of the ECJ ruling in Infopaq on UK copyright law’, (2010) 32(5) 
EIPR, 247-251; E. Rosati, ‘Originality in US and UK copyright experiences as a springboard for an 
EU-wide reform debate’, (2010) 41(5) IIC, 524-543, 542-543. 
137 A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011) 47-48. 
138 Usually the CJEU has to deal with highly complex technical matters of IP law which makes judicial 
harmonisation more complicated. As to the problem of the judges’ expertise on the relationship 
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Copyright Code does not attempt a definition of ‘originality’ and just uses ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation.’ The footnotes make clear that the Code does not decide 
generally in favour of either the ‘personal stamp/touch’ or the ‘skill and labour’ 
originality.139 The Herderian paradox can become apparent in such a situation: even if 





The role of moral rights, and copyright transferability 
The concept of originality and the philosophical differences between copyright and 
author’s rights systems are closely connected with the position of moral rights within 
the corresponding protection system. As said, the copyright systems are concerned 
with the creation of the property of copyright by its author through his/her own skill, 
labour, effort and judgment and protect the author for the investment in the making of 
the copyright property. Thus copyright is essentially a protection against parasitical 
unfair competition in the continental European understanding, but does not require an 
individualisation of a distinct authorial personality for the definition of originality.140 
A personality protection in form of moral rights is therefore not part of the copyright 
protection system, and indeed, the moral rights rules have been tacked on like the 
scaffolding to a building, mostly in light of Art. 6bis of the Berne Convention – in the 
UK in 1988, in the US (as a partial protection system) in 1990, in Australia in 
2000.141 One could see the copyright-moral right relationship as an extremely dualist 
system.142 In contrast, the moral rights regime in the author’s rights countries is the 
skeleton and metal frame of the author’s rights house without which it would 
collapse. Hence the concept of originality in author’s rights countries requires some 
personal features in the work which refer back to an individual author: the work must 
                                                                                                                                           
between copyright and design law, L. Bently, ‘Case Comment: The return of industrial copyright?’ 
(2012) 34(10) EIPR 654-672, at 663-664 (on Flos (C-168/09). 
139 Wittem Project, European Copyright Code, Art. 1.1 (1) and footnotes 6 and 7: ‘(6) The Code does 
not use or define the term original, but in practice it might still be used to indicate that the production 
qualifies as a (protected) work. (7) The term ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’ is derived from the 
acquis (notably for computer programs, databases and photographs). It can be interpreted as the 
‘average’ European threshold, presuming it is set somewhat higher than skill and labour. This is 
possible if emphasis is put on the element of creation. For factual and functional works, the focus will 
be more on a certain level of skill (judgement) and labour, whereas for productions in the artistic field 
the focus will be more on personal expression.’ 
140  A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011), 40-42, 55 and note 379 (on the concept of 
ergänzender Leistungsschutz in German law). 
141 UK CDPA 1988, Part I, chapter IV, ss. 77 et seq.; US Copyright Act 1976, § 106A (incorporation of 
Visual Artists Rights Act 1990); Australian Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000, no. 159. 
142 W. R. Cornish, ‘Moral Rights under the 1988 Act’, (1989), 11(12) EIPR 1989, 449-452: ‘an 
extreme form of dualism’. 
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‘bear the stamp of the author’, be ‘the imprint of the author’s personality’,143 or, as 
the German statute states, must be a ‘personal intellectual creation’.144 The Austrian 
equivalent provision is even more instructive when it says ‘specific/peculiar 
intellectual creations’.145 This is to be distinguished from the originality rule in the 
EU Directives, ‘own intellectual creation’, which stresses that the work must originate 
from the author, but not necessarily that it must be specific and too personal. Thus EU 
law, as it stands, does not invite a more comprehensive moral rights regime, nor 
would the lobbying groups of the copyright industries be interested in that: the 
absence of the moral rights rules of Art. 6bis in the otherwise wholesale import of the 
Berne Convention in the TRIPS Agreement146 illustrates that well. This also shows 
how weak Art. 6bis is as a harmonising force. The argument that harmonisation of 
moral rights in the EU should not be problematic because Art. 6bis exists already as 
an accepted common basis in the copyright and author’s right’s world alike, overlooks 
the fact that Art. 6bis does not attempt a harmonisation but only introduces these 
personal rights of authors, without making a statement as to the position of that right 
within the respective copyright/author’s right concepts – and herein lies the problem 
for EU-wide harmonisation. Because the Berne Convention is silent, it can cater for 
copyright and author’s rights systems alike. Similarly, in the case of fixation 
(protection requirement for copyright systems) the Berne Convention regards fixation 
requirements not as formalities for copyright protection which the Berne Convention 
otherwise prohibits:147 relinquishing harmonisation or unification allowed copyright 
countries to join.  
However, a comprehensive harmonisation of EU copyright will have to take a 
view on moral rights, since the author’s rights systems lose their basis and their 
justification without the moral rights. A compromise will be difficult to achieve. 
Either one restates the international obligations by Art 6bis of the Berne Convention 
(attribution and integrity right), then one does not really attempt any harmonisation 
for the reasons just stated. Or one goes further, by adding one or two moral rights, 
such as the Wittem Group does in its draft EU Copyright Code (divulgation right), 
with the option to restrict the exercise of moral rights or even allow complete waiver 
in defined cases. 148  The possibility of limited non-exercise would meet with 
resistance particularly in France and Germany. Furthermore, a moral right limited in 
                                                 
143 M. Vivant and J.-M. Bruguière, Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, 2nd ed. (2013), 237, 240 with 
critical comments as to the practical application of this principle.  
144 German § 2 (2) Author’s Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1965. 
145  Austrian Author’s Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1936, § 1 (1) (‘eigentümliche geistige 
Schöpfungen’). 
146 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 9 (2). 
147 Berne Convention, Art. 5 (2), together with Art. 2 (2). 
148 Wittem Project, European Copyright Code, Articles 3.1-3.6 and footnotes 31-36. 
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time, as the Wittem Group suggests,149 may not be acceptable in France. One can 
imagine the negotiations among 28 (or probably 27) Member States about the 
decision which moral rights should be included in a harmonising law, how they shall 
be defined, and to what extent they can be renounced.   
One cannot address this problem with a superficial and toothless compromise 
dressed up as the triumph of a democratic process of decision-making. A proper 
harmonisation of EU law, if it is to have any substantive relevance at all, would have 
to make significant incisions in the moral right regimes of the Member States. 
Otherwise any legislative project would be weak and possibly insignificant, 
something which the Wittem Project150 and (as a real legislative act of the EU) the 
Information Society Directive have been accused of.151 The matter is not a side issue. 
The precise definition of originality is influenced by the role of the moral rights in a 
harmonised EU copyright system. A proper harmonisation is pointless and may create 
disuniting chaos among the Member States without at least a clear definition of 
originality and a clear communication as to how this definition is to be understood. 
Besides, it is ultimately the moral rights philosophy which determines the 
transferability of the economic rights, a commercially eminently important issue. The 
monist systems of Germany and Austria do not allow the assignment of the author’s 
right, because the inalienable personal aspect of the moral right and the economic 
aspect of the author’s right are so intertwined that these form an inseparable whole. In 
these countries an assignment is largely emulated by an extensive exclusive licence. 
But transferability would presumably be of major interest to the copyright industries 
and their lobbying groups. A possible compromise could be the change of the monist 
approach in Germany and Austria to the dualist approach, as in France,152 so that 
assignability would be formally possible,153 but the moral rights regime would not be 
weakened at all. The monist approach in Germany and Austria is the result of legal 
doctrine; it is not an entirely inevitable interpretation of the statute.154 Although such 
a modification would be in legal interpretation and doctrine only, it is unlikely to 
happen in Germany – or in Austria, where the monist theory originated.155 A more 
                                                 
149 Wittem Project, European Copyright Code, Articles 3.3 (2) and 3.4 (2). 
150 E. Rosati, ‘The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code’, (2010) 5(12) JIPLR 862-868, at 
864. 
151 B. Hugenholtz, ‘Why the Copyright Directive is unimportant, and possibly invalid’, (2000) 22(11) 
EIPR 499-505, at 499-500. 
152 A. Strowel, Droit d’auteur et copyright (Bruxelles, Paris: Émile Bruylant, Librairie generale de 
droit et de jurisprudence, 1993), 494-495. 
153 Discussion in A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011), 206-208, with references to national 
laws. 
154 But the monist theory is uncontroversial in Germany and Austria, see E. Ulmer, Urheber- und 
Verlagsrecht, 2nd ed. (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 1960), 97-104, and (less clearly) § 11 
German Authors Rights Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) 1965. 
155 M. Rehbinder, Urheberrecht, 16th ed. (2010), 16. 
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radical departure by way of statutory amendment is even less realistic. Any attempt at 
the approximation of the author’s rights systems’ concept of moral rights towards that 
of the copyright regime of the UK and the US, with free assignability of copyright 
and an almost irrelevant status of the moral rights, would probably lead to an all-out 
war with the author’s rights countries, although the practical importance of the moral 
rights is surprisingly limited there.156 
The matter is ideological – one can make politics with copyright. In the last 
years copyright has become one of the best known areas of the law among the general 
public. The principles of moral rights are easy to understand and are suitable to be 
packed into political and populist slogans which political parties, especially EU-
sceptical parties, may use. In the present unstable political climate it is possible that a 
populist mass movement can add a further argument against the already weakened EU 
by pretending to fight for the indefeasibility of the national and traditional paternity 
and integrity rights against the ‘undemocratic dictate from Brussels’. 157 It is true, 
almost nobody knows what the dualist and monist approaches are, but that is 
irrelevant:158 an academically informed populism is a contradiction in terms. Who 
understood the theological implications of the word ‘filioque’ added to the credo 
which contributed to the division between the Western and the Eastern Churches?159 
Conceptually a compromise on moral rights is very hard to imagine, politically it can 
probably not be achieved. That said, without a compromise a functioning 
harmonisation of core copyright law in the EU is unrealistic in the long run. 
Therefore, it will probably be wise to drop altogether any ambitions to harmonise or 
unify the copyright laws in Europe for the foreseeable future, and the probable 
departure of the main copyright jurisdiction of the UK from the EU may not 
necessarily make matters much easier. Some diversity may help retaining unity. 
 
 
Exceptions and limitations 
The copyright exceptions and limitations also allow an analysis of the ‘Herderian 
paradox’. The harmonisation of this area is Art. 5 of the Information Society 
Directive,160 containing mandatory (Art. 5 (1)) and facultative (Art. 5 (2) and (3)) 
                                                 
156 See discussion in A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (2011), 240-243. 
157 Certain interpretations of the German author’s rights law in the national-socialist spirit after 1933 
give an eerie indication as to how that could be done, for example by A. Elster, ‘Deutsche 
Rechtsgedanken im Urheberrecht’, in: H. O. De Boor, A. Elster et al. (eds.), Archiv für Urheber- Film 
und Theaterrecht, vol. 6 (Berlin: J. Springer, 1933), 189-207, at 191, 193, 198-199. 
158 In the recent ‘Brexit’ referendum in the UK a large number of people voted against EU membership 
of the UK without any knowledge about the EU at all. See e.g. Brian Fung, ‘The British are frantically 
Googling what the EU is, hours after voting to leave it’, The Washington Post, 24 June 2016. 
159 R. W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (1970), 64-67. 
160 Directive 2001/29/EC. 
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rules. This exhaustive list of exceptions161 is founded on the principle of the ‘three-
step test’162 deriving from the Berne Convention,163 the TRIPS Agreement164 and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty:165 exceptions and limitations only in special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the right holder.166  
Apart from the overarching general and international principle of the three-
step test, the European Directive only attempts a light-touch harmonisation at best. 
Leaving the very specific exception of temporary copies within a technological 
process (computer) in Art. 5 (1) aside, the other twenty exceptions, in relation to 
reproduction, communication and making available and distribution of authorial 
works, phonogram and film fixations, among other things, are optional. 167  The 
framework is an opt-in catalogue for the Member States who cannot otherwise 
introduce new exceptions beyond the conclusive list. However, this rule is slightly 
undermined by a proviso which allows the continued existence of national exceptions 
in ‘cases of minor importance’ if the use is analogous only and does not conflict with 
the free movement of goods and services in the EU and the exceptions set out in the 
Directive.168 This proviso is also subject to the tree-step test; another general principle 
similar to the US fair use concept does not exist beside the specific exceptions.169  
Art. 5 of the Information Society Directive seems to reflect a fear of the 
effects of the ‘Herderian paradox’: a deep harmonisation and too prescriptive list of 
the exceptions may drive the Member States apart and against any development 
towards unification or standardisation, hence such inflexible harmonisation has not 
been attempted in the first place. This is obviously an ex post facto analysis, not a 
description of the intentions in the making of the Directive: never has the idea of what 
is called here ‘Herderian paradox’ entered the mind of the EU legislature, neither 
then, nor today. The optional nature of most of the exceptions in the Information 
Society Directive is rather a historical accident and seems to call for a more rigorous 
reformulation of some of the exceptions towards a more compulsory regime which 
achieves genuine harmonisation. The recently published Proposal for a Directive on 
                                                 
161 Directive 2001/29/EC, Recital (32). 
162 Directive 2001/29/EC, Art. 5 (5). 
163 Berne Convention, Art. 9 (2). 
164 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 13. 
165 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 10 (1). 
166 On the history of the three-step test, see Ch. Geiger, D. Gervais, M. Senftleben, ‘The Three-Step 
Test revisited: How to use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright’, (2013-2014) 29 American 
University International Law Review, 581-626, at 583. 
167 Helpful overview of the EU legislative scheme of copyright exceptions and limitations in: J. Pila, P. 
Torremans, European Intellectual Property Law (2016), 332. 
168 Directive 2001/29/EC, Art. 5 (3) (o). 
169 Ch. Geiger and F. Schönherr, ‘The Information Society Directive’, in: I. Stamatoudi, P. Torremans 
(eds.), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014), 395, at 439-440. 
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Copyright in the Digital Single Market170 reinforces this impression. For example, 
Art. 4 provides for a partial mandatory exception 171 to the right of reproduction, 
communication, making available to the public for the sole purpose of illustration for 
teaching including digital and online use which complements particularly the optional 
Art. 5 (3) (a) of the Information Society Directive. 172  Thus an improvement of 
harmonisation against unintended diversity is sought. The ‘Herderian’ unity in 
diversity is inadvertent, not intended, in case of the EU provisions on exceptions and 
limitations: it could not be otherwise, for the idea of ‘unity in diversity’ runs counter 
to the general EU agenda of harmonising the national laws for further economic 
integration. As one would expect, the new Proposal restates the general principle of 
harmonisation for enhancing the functioning of the internal market.173 Although Art. 
5 of the Information Society Directive does not actually harmonise the exceptions and 
limitations in effect very much because of its facultative provisions, it is nevertheless 
officially regarded as doing exactly that.174 The exceptions and limitations cannot be 
seen as a demonstration of any ‘Herderian’ notion of diversity in EU law-making. 
 
 
EU law pre-emption in IP law and international treatises by-passing EU law as an 
option for legal unification measures 
There are two methods of legal harmonisation in effect – by open or hidden 
imposition of separate rules or concepts – which can conceal the problems direct 
harmonisation by EU legislation may create. The first is EU pre-emption of national 
law-making by European legislators, the second the circumvention of EU law by 
intergovernmental treaties among EU Member States outside the EU legislative 
framework. These general issues of EU constitutional law can only be touched upon 
briefly.  
The considered autonomous concepts of EU copyright law can be seen as 
applications of the doctrine of EU pre-emption. In case of conflicts between national 
law of a Member State and supranational EU law the doctrine of pre-emption 
determines if and to what extent the national law will be set aside by EU law.175 
Following US constitutional law doctrine, one can distinguish between field pre-
emption (EU has exhaustively legislated for the field, i.e. to the complete exclusion of 
                                                 
170 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, 14 Sept. 2016, COM (2016) 593 final, 2016/0280 (COD). 
171 See Art. 4 (1): ‘Member States shall provide …’ 
172 See also Proposal on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, Recital (14). 
173 Proposal on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, Recitals (1) and (2). 
174 For example, the Proposal on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, Explanatory Memorandum, 
pt. 1 (p. 2), states simply: ‘Exceptions and limitations to copyright and neighbouring rights are 
harmonised at EU level.’  
175 R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 364. 
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national law), obstacle pre-emption (material conflict between European and national 
law, but not in relation to a specific European rule) and rule pre-emption (national 
legislation contradicts a specific European rule). These pre-emptions can be express 
or implied.176 The EU pre-emption doctrine is also relevant to EU copyright law.177 
The basis for a comprehensive unifying copyright Regulation would be Article 118 
TFEU.178 This statutory basis and the ensuing application of pre-emption leaves the 
extent of the actual harmonisation to judicial interpretation by the national courts first 
and, finally and decisively, to the CJEU.179 The actual statutory text of a Directive – 
here the most relevant one is the Information Society Directive – normally appears as 
not too dirigiste and obligatory in its harmonising thrust in that it allows for 
significant discretion, or, put differently, legal uncertainty.180 
The method of circumventing possible obstacles of EU supranational law or 
constitutional constraints by intergovernmental treaties between (most) EU Member 
States has not been used for copyright legislation, but became crucially important for 
financial regulation following the banking crisis of 2008. In particular, four 
international law treaties, including the Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty of Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact), have been concluded ‘on the side’ 
of the EU legal system between most, not all, EU Member States as sovereign 
states.181 It is not impossible that this route of implementation could be taken for 
particularly contentious issues in copyright. A similar method has partly been applied 
already for the introduction of the EU unitary patent system: the ‘unified patent court’ 
was introduced by separate international agreement,182 and the relevant Regulations183 
by ‘enhanced cooperation’. Spain’s legal challenge of this legislative route was 
dismissed by the CJEU in 2013184 and 2015.185 Such a form of integration effectively 
                                                 
176 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 365-367 with examples from ECJ/CJEU case law. 
177 E. Rosati, ‘Copyright in the EU: in search of (in)flexibilities, (2014) 9 (7) JIPLP, 585-598, at 587-
594. 
178 T. Cook and E. Derclaye, ‘An EU Copyright Code; what and how, if ever?’, (2011), IPQ 3, 259-
269, at 263-264. Copyright Directives for the harmonisation of national laws are passed under Article 
114 TFEU, see, as to the relevant criteria (internal market considerations etc.), A. Ramalho, 
‘Conceptualising the European Union’s competence in copyright – what can the EU do?’ (2014) 45(2) 
IIC, 178-220, at 181, 184-185. 
179 E.g. Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let (C-277/10), para. 64, see also discussion by Rosati, 
‘Copyright in the EU: in search of (in)flexibilities’, 589-590. 
180 See Th. Dreier, ‘Thoughts on revising the limitations on copyright under Directive 2001/29’, (2015) 
JIPLP 11(2), 138-146, at 141. 
181 B. De Witte, ‘Euro Crisis responses and the EU legal order: increased institutional variation or 
constitutional mutation?’, (2015) 11(3) European Constitutional Law Review, 434-457, at 438. De 
Witte stresses, probably somewhat controversially, that ‘there is no evidence of an overall 
intergovernmental plot against the integrity of the EU legal order’. 
182 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (2013) OJ 2013/C 175/01. 
183 Regulation 1257/2012 (enhanced cooperation regarding unitary patent protection) and Regulation 
1260/2012 (translation arrangements). 
184 CJEU C-274/11 and C-295/11.  
 28 
undermines the EU itself as a supranational legislating entity and, because of its 
doubtful democratic legitimacy and transparency, may be constitutionally most 
problematic in many of the respective Member States. It is a form of integration that 
makes the EU appear redundant and is ultimately corrosive to the very fabric and the 





The European Union is under high pressure as never before in history: the banking 
crisis and ensuing sovereign debt crisis, especially in southern European Member 
States, and the refugee crisis, contribute substantially to the predicament of the EU. 
Further legal integration and harmonisation of laws at EU level do not strengthen the 
EU, but only have an additional corrosive effect: the more one concentrates on legal 
unification at EU level, the more will the national Member States drift apart, 
politically and legally. This ‘Herderian paradox’, as one may call this causal 
connection, is a phenomenon EU officials and legal academics should take to heart 
soon if they do not want to become an involuntary instrument in the disintegration of 
the EU as an idea and as a political and economic reality. Copyright may appear as a 
small area of law among the vast body of EU legislation and regulation. But copyright 
can obtain a ‘face’: it is an area of the law relatively well-known to the general public 
who encounter copyright (and infringement) with their computers, internet, the 
‘consumption’ of music and films, and photographs: things everybody uses or creates. 
Agitation of EU-hostile populist political parties is unlikely to work with abstract and 
technical banking regulation, but can be quite successful in relation to copyright, 
among other themes. For example, EU opponents do not discuss the possible 
constitutional shift towards intergovernmental institutions within the EU outside the 
supranational constitutional system of the EU in the wake of the euro crisis,186 but 
immigration. In the future, it could also be moral rights or fair dealing. 
Further harmonisation of copyright law is not only questionable on pragmatic 
political grounds, it is also unproductive on legal grounds. Fundamental concepts of 
copyright law, such as originality and moral rights, can either not be defined with 
sufficient precision at EU level to achieve a true harmonisation among Member States 
(originality), or the ideological conceptual differences are too great that the Member 
                                                                                                                                           
185 CJEU C-146/13 (subject-matter was the annulment of Regulation (EU) 1257/2012). See extensive 
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States cannot achieve a compromise without an unacceptable damage to the legal 
tradition of one or even both sides (moral rights). Purported harmonisation through 
ineffective tools (Directives which allow generously Member States to opt out187) or 
veiled harmonisation through judicial ingenuity, but not necessarily consistency, by 
the CJEU, do not promote the European cause and give succour to the argument that 
the EU has a serious democratic deficit.188 
The question remains what will happen to the present copyright regime in the 
UK which prepares leaving the EU after the ‘Brexit’ referendum. The question were 
similar if the EU were really to disintegrate, a perspective which has become a 
possibility for the first time in history. The EU could be destabilised further with the 
UK having decided to leave the EU. An end of the EU (and that would presumably 
occur in several phases) probably has little fundamental effect on the copyright 
systems in the Member States for the time being. For Britain, apart from the 
international conventions (Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Treaties 
in particular189), expediency will decide in favour of the continued existence of the 
copyright Directives, since they are implemented in the national laws. Law is 
characterised by inertia, and it is unwise to abolish useful EU legislation just because 
it comes from the EU. Gradually the respective national laws will deviate from one 
another by legal amendments and emergence of national case law, but the discrepancy 
is unlikely to become too great in a world of global trade and the internet. It is rather 
possible that former EU Member States would conclude intergovernmental treaties on 
issues of copyright law which harmonise the law on the basis of classical public 
international law. The EU itself has gone down this route in other areas, especially in 
the regulations concerning the sovereign debt crisis, 190  and so has played 
inadvertently into the hands of critics who may argue that the EU demonstrates its 
own irrelevance as a supranational organisation. However, one should not blame the 
EU too much. It is the sole responsibility of the UK if a severe contraction of the 
markets occurs and if its territory may disintegrate as a result of the rather irrational 
decision in favour of a ‘Brexit’ (constitutionally the implementation of ‘Brexit’ may 
prove difficult). Furthermore, the UK has deprived itself of the opportunity to take 
part in necessary essential reforms of the EU for more pluralism. But even without the 
UK, it would be desirable to have a more flexible European Union which expands and 
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contracts among its Member States during different historical epochs like a flexible 
universe based on the EU Treaties, rather than having a relentless gravitational force 
towards ever more legal and economic integration and unification: such a 
development would lead to a black hole. That also applies to the harmonisation of 
copyright in the EU. The European idea (especially, never ever war again between 
European countries) is less attached to the institutions of the EU or the UK than these 
may think. The European idea is older and stronger, more intellectual and more 
human. Copyright is the area of law that can show that. 
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